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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
SHIRLEY BERUBE, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. 
FASHION CENTRE, LTD. dba 
FASHION GAL OF OGDENf 
JOSEPH E. TORMAN dba WESTERN 
STATES POLYGRAPH and JOHN and 
JANE DOES 1-10f 
Defendants-Respondents, * 
ISSUES PRESENTED 
Background. The Plaintiff, Shirley Berube, was an employee 
at the Defendant Fashion Centre Ltd.'s Ogden, Utah retail outlet. 
As a result of inventory shortages at the Ogden store, the 
employer requested that all store employees submit to a polygraph 
examination. The Plaintiff submitted to a polygraph test but 
later was requested to submit to a second polygraph test. The 
Plaintiff willingly submitted to the second polygraph test. 
Shortly thereafter, the Plaintiff was requested to submit to a 
third polygraph test. When she failed to report for the third 
polygraph test, the employer terminated her employment, not-
withstanding her request to have it rescheduled. 
Case No. 20673 
SB1 Appeals I 
Issues, The decisions of this court on their face cause the 
normal employment relationship in Utah to fall within what has 
been generally referred to as an "at-will" employment relation-
ship. 
This case presents the following questions in the above 
context: 
(1) Is the covenant of good faith and fair dealing (inherent 
in all contracts under Utah law) present in an "at-will" employer/ 
employee relationship? 
(2) If sof did the Trial Court err in failing to properly 
instruct the jury, as a matter of lawf that an implied covenant 
of good faith and fair dealing was an inherent aspect of the 
employment relationship? 
(3) Does Section 34-37-16(2) Utah Code Annotated prevent 
employers from terminating employees for failure to take or pass 
a polygraph examination? 
(4) Did the District Court err in denying the Plaintiff the 
right to amend her complaint to plead a breach of the statutory 
duty set forth in Section 34-37-16(2)? 
(5) Did the District Court err in granting partial summary 
judgment dismissing the causes of action against the first 
polygraph examiner and the employer when the court held that the 
proximate cause of the employee's termination was the failure of 
the employee to take the third polygraph test and was notf as 
alleged by the Plaintiff, casually connected with the negligent 
administration and interpretation of the first examination? 
(6) Whether the District Court erred in denying Appellant's 
motion for a new trial on the grounds set forth in the motion, 
namely that the District Court's instructions to the jury did not 
accurately reflect or state the correct law, i.e., assuming that 
Utah law recognizes a claim for relief based upon breach of an 
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, whether the 
District Court's instructions to the jury properlv stated the 
law as to whether or not a written contract or anv specific dura-
tion of employment needed to be established before the jury could 
consider whether the employer breached the implied covenant of 
good faith and fair dealing inherent in their employment rela-
tionship. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, 
1/ 
ORDINANCES, RULES AND REGULATIONS 
Rule 51 Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides: 
RULE 51 
INSTRUCTIONS TO JURY: OBJECTIONS 
At the close ot the evidence or at such earlier 
time during the trial as the court reasonably 
directs, any party may file written requests that 
the court instruct the jury on the law as set 
forth in said requests. The court shall inform 
counsel of its proposed action upon the requests 
prior to instructing the jury; and it shall fur-
nish counsel with a copy of its proposed instruc-
tions, unless the parties stipulate that such 
instructions may be given orally, or otherwise 
waive this requirement. Tf the instructions are 
to be given in writing, all objections thereto 
must be made before the instructions are given to 
1/ 
Pertinent parts have been emphasized by appellant's counsel. 
the jury; otherwise, objections may be made to the 
instructions after they are given to the jury, but 
before the jury retires to consider its verdict. 
No party may assign as error the giving or the 
failure to give an instruction unless he objects 
thereto in the matter to which he objects and 
the grounds for his objection. Notwithstanding 
the foregoing requirement, the appellate court, 
in its discretion and in the interest of justice, 
may review the giving or failure to give an 
instruction. Opportunity shall be given to make 
objections, and they shall be made, out of the 
hearing of the jury. 
Arguments for the respective parties shall be 
made after the court has instructed the jury. The 
court shall not comment on the evidence in the 
case, and if the court states anv of the evidence, 
it must instruct the jury that they are the exclu-
sive judges of all guestions of fact. 
Section 34-37-16 Utah Code Annotated (enacted 1981 provides: 
§34-37-16. Surreptitious examinations prohibited. 
It shall be a violation of this act to conduct a 
deception detection examination by the instrument 
without the phvsical presence of the subject and 
through a surreptitious manner where a subject is 
not aware of the examination. Furthermore, it 
shall be unlawful for: (1) any deception detection 
examination to be conducted by instrument by out-
of-state examiners through telephonic means to 
anyone in Utah or for Utah examiners to use 
telephonic means to determine truth or deception; 
or (2) refusal to submit to such examination to be 
the basis for denying or terminating employment. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case. This case is an appeal from the Second 
Judicial District Court in and for the County of Weber, Utah, 
the Honorable David E. Roth presiding at trial. The Plaintiff 
Shirely Berube asserted below that the termination of her 
employment by the Defendant Fashion Centre Ltd. constituted a 
breach of the convenant of good faith and fair dealing inherent 
in their employee-employer relationship (contract) and sought a 
determination by the court that the employer had breached the 
contract and was liable for damages accordingly. 
In addition to the foregoing, the complaint alleged a cause 
of action against the first polygrapher and the employer relating 
to the negligent administration, interpretation and reporting of 
her first polygraph examination which resulted in subsequent 
request for additional tests and ultimately in her termination 
from employment. (This latter cause of action was dismissed at 
summary judgment.) The Complaint also alleged defamation and 
interference with prospective economic advantage. 
Disposition by Lower Court. Following a four day jury trial, 
the trial court entered an order of "no cause of action" in accor-
dance with the jury's response to Question 1 of the special 
Interrogatories submitted. The jury determined that based on the 
evidence and the law as contained in the Jury Instructions, that 
there was no employment contract which existed between the 
employer and the employee. Consequently, the jury never reached 
the issue of whether the employer breached the covenant of good 
faith and fair dealing. 
The additional causes of action plead in the complaint were 
disposed of by rulings of Judge Walquist, Judge Hyde and Judge Roth 
at various stages of the pre-trial proceedings and during trial as 
set forth more fully below. 
Relief Sought on Appeal. The Plaintiff Shirley Berube seeks 
a final ruling of this court regarding the issues set out at 
pages 2-3. In the event the court holds that there were errors in 
the proceeding below, then she would request the court to remand 
the case for a new trial with sufficient clarifications to allow 
the trial court to proceed to a final resolution of this case. 
1/ 
Statement of Facts. Plaintiff Shirley Berube was employed 
by the Defendant/Respondent Fashion Centre as assistant manager 
at the Ogden, Utah store. (R. 96 L. 18) She had advanced from 
sales person to assistant manager receiving good/very good/ 
superior ratings. (Ex. 5P, R. 880 L. 10 - R. 896 L. 25.) There 
was no written employment agreement between the partiesr but 
Fashion Centre, the employer, did have written rules and regula-
tions regarding personnel practices. (See Exhibit IP, R. 871 
L. 10 - R. 872 L.13.) Specifically, the employer had rules 
relating to the taking of polygraph tests. These rules provided 
that: "Except in the situations listed below, an employee may not 
be dismissed. . . An employee may be terminated without prior 
warning for the following reasons: 
(a) . . . 
(g) refusal to take a polygraph test." 
(h) . . . 
(See Exhibit P. 1) 
1/ 
All citations are to the record of the proceeding below as 
paginated by the clerk pursuant to Rule 11(b) and 24(e) U.R.A.P., 
including the transcript. Where necessary, references to lines 
of transcript will be shown as (R. 771 L. 2-10) meaning paginated 
record, page 771, lines 2-10. All exhibits are referred to as 
Ex. and are contained in the record at R. 352. 
Fashion Centre concluded an inventory shortage had occurred 
in the previous year and requested the store employees to take a 
polygraph test. (R. 897 L. 11-14) The Plaintiff took the test 
along with approximately nine other store employees. (Three store 
employees refused to submit and were allowed to quit. R. 901-902) 
The polygraph test was conducted by the Defendant, Western 
States Polygraph, using questions supplied by the employer Fashion 
Centre. No background information or investigation was provided 
Western States concerning the inventory shortages. (Exhibit 12 P.) 
Following her polygraph test, the Plaintiff inquired as to 
whether or not she had passed the examination. She was informed 
by the examiner that she had indeed passed the examination and he 
even commented to her in a joking manner that she would not have 
to look for a new job while on her upcoming vacation. (R. 643) 
The polygraph examination administered by Western States 
was a relevant/irrelevant polygraph exam. (R. 276, 279, Para. 6A) 
The questions supplied by the Defendant Fashion Centre necessi-
tated that this type of examination be used. This type of test 
is prohibited by state polygraph regulations. (R. 279, Para. 6A) 
The summary of the polygraph test communicated by Western States 
to Fashion Centre showed that the Plaintiff was answering truth-
fully when asked the following Fashion Centre relevant questions: 
2. Did you ever steal or cheat that FASHION GAL store out 
of any cash? 
3. Did you steal any cash at that FASHION GAL? 
4. Have you used any scheme to steal or cheat that 
FASHION GAL store? 
5. Did you ever steal any merchandise from that FASHION 
GAL store? 
6. Did you ever remove any merchandise from that FASHION 
GAL store without paying for it? 
7. Did you ever help anyone, in any way, to steal merchan-
dise or money from that FASHION GAL store? 
8. Did you ever deliberately allow merchandise to be removed 
from that FASHION GAL store without it being paid for? 
9. Have you ever intentionally failed bo register a VISA 
or Master Card sale? 
10. Have you ever given or written a false merchandise credit 
or refund? 
11. Have you ever intentionally recorded a false payment on 
a layaway? 
MANAGEMENT QUESTIONS ONLY 
12. Have you ever falsified the Daily Report in any way? 
13. Have you ever falsified Mark Downs? 
14. Have you ever falsified any company documents for 
personal gain or benefit? 
15. Have you knowingly violated any company policy with 
the intention of cheating the company out of money or 
merchandise? 
See Exhibit 12 P. Fashion Centre was acutely aware of what the 
employee had passed since they designed and supplied the questions 
used in the polygraph examination. (R. 876-877) The examiner, 
however, reported he found deception when the Plaintiff was asked 
the following question, "Do you know for certain who has cheated 
or stolen anything from that Fashion Gal store?" Plaintiff 
answered "no" to the question. A post test interview discloses 
the following explanation with regards to the alleged deception. 
-8-
"Post test - She stated that although she doesn't 
know for certain of others - She has very strong suspi-
cions of others - especially those who threatened to 
quit rather than take polygraph test." (See Exhibit 12 P.) 
The test did not show deception as the Defendant Fashion 
Centre has maintained throughout this case. (R. 780-781) 
Western's summary communicated to Fashion Centre states that the 
subject showed deception onlv on the one question/ not the test -
and then immediately disclosed sufficient facts to explain why 
there may have been a stress reaction to the question. When Mr. 
Torman was asked whether the communication from his company to 
Fashion Gal disclosed whether or not Shirley Berube, the 
Plaintiff/ passed the examination, he stated: 
"Wellf she herself did not show any signs of attempted 
deception according to this. In other words, there's 
nothing here to indicate anv deception on her part as 
far as any dishonesty towards the company." 
(Torman deposition/ pages 57-58.) Fashion Centre, however, 
interpreted that she had failed the examination. (R. 905 L. 23-24 
to R. 907) 
As a direct result of Western State Polygraph's report/ the 
employer requested the Plaintiff submit to a second polygraph test 
which the employee willingly did and passed. (R. 907 L. 8-9) The 
second test was conducted by a different polygraph company 
(Polygraph Screening Services) which utilized a specific polygraph 
test as opposed to relevant/irrelevant test conducted by Western. 
(R. 279/ Para. 6B) 
The affidavit of Bennett Lerner (submitted in support of the 
employer's motion for summary judgment) states that the purpose of 
the second test was to give the Plaintiff an opportunity to "clear 
herself of any deception." (R. 212) Polygraph Screening Services 
informed the employer that the Plaintiff was truthful when she was 
asked the following relevant questions (R. 908-910): 
1. Do you know for certain who has cheated or stolen 
anything from that FASHION GAL store? 
3. Did you steal any cash at that FASHION GAL? 
5. Did you ever steal any merchandise from that FASHION 
GAL store? 
8. Did you ever deliberately allow merchandise to be 
removed from that FASHION GAL store without it being 
paid for? 
See Exhibit 13 P. 
Shortly thereafter, the employer requested the Plaintiff take 
a third polygraph examination, which she refused. The employer 
never identified to the Plaintiff the outcome of the first test 
(R. 645) although they did disclose to the Plaintiff that she had 
passed the second examination. (R. 645-648) She failed to report 
for the third test as she felt that the company was attempting to 
trick her into having a poor examination so that they would have 
grounds for termination. She felt the request for a third test 
2/ 
was abusive and was an affront to her honesty. The Plaintiff was 
2/ 
The Plaintiff submitted herself to the second test knowing only 
what she had been told by Western States. (The Plaintiff did not 
find out what was communicated to Fashion Centre until shortly 
before her deposition taken around February 7, 1984, when the 
weekend prior to the deposition documents were made available to 
Plaintiff's counsel pursuant to a request for production of docu-
ments and it became clear during the deposition that the deposi-
tion examiner assumed that the Plaintiff knew a reason why the 
second polygraph test was required.) 
confused by the Defendant's demands for successive tests and 
sought out the advice of friends and family who advised her not 
to take the third test. (R. 650-651 & R. 912) In view of the 
Plaintiff's failure to report for the third polygraph test, the 
employer terminated the Plaintiff's employment, notwithstanding 
her request to have it rescheduled, which was made the after her 
termination. (R. 656) 
Fashion Centre's regional manager, Jerry Brooks, wrote in 
the personnel file of the Plaintiff the following: 
On April 28, 1982, Shirley Berube was scheduled 
to take her third polygraph in connection with 
10/1/81 shortage on the inventory. She failed 
to pass her first polygraph and passed the 
second one given. She was then required to 
take a third polygraph to establish a result 
from the first two. She declined to take the 
final polygraph. 
(R. 917-918, See last page, Exhibit 5P.) 
At the time of termination Fashion Centre's District Manager, 
Mr. Wilson, represented that he would reinstate the Plaintiff if 
she would change her mind, which she did within 24 hours conceding 
to submit to the third examination. However, Mr. Wilson had 
already filled Ms. Berube's position and no action was ever taken 
to rehire her. (R. £57-658) 
Thereafter, Plaintiff in seeking other employment applied at 
"Brooks" as well as other retail stores in the Ogden area. (See 
Exhibits 8P & 14P, R. 826.) When the manager of Brooks called the 
Defendant Fashion Centre for a reference, JoLynn Flint, manager of 
the Defendant's Ogden Store, reported that the Plaintiff had 
refused to take "a" polygraph test and that this was the basis 
for her termination. Plaintiff was refused employment at Brooks. 
(R. 826-828) The recommendation is of a type which chills 
employment prospects greatly. (R. 586f R. 595) 
During depositionsf Joseph ^orman dba Western State 
Polygraph, testified that the first polygraph examination given 
to the Plaintiff did not meet the minimum standards of the 
polygraph profession. (Torman deposition pages 46-47.) Because 
Judge Hyde dismissed the negligence aspect of the case on summary 
judgement the trial court did not allow questioning in this area 
at the time of trial. 
Attached as part of the Plaintiff's reply to the Motion for 
Summary Judgment submitted by the Defendant, Fashion Centref was 
the affidavit of the Plaintiff's polygraph expert indicating that 
the Plaintiff passed both examinations and that the Defendants 
Fashion Gal and Western States were negligent in interoreting 
otherwise. (R. 276-284) The affidavit further disclosed that 
it was unreasonable for the Defendant Fashion Centre to require 
a third polygraph examination taking into consideration the type 
of tests given, i.e., that the Plaintiff passed the examinations 
particularly the second test which was a specific examination -
an examination designed to specifically ascertain Plaintiff's 
honesty - as opposed to the first examination which was charac-
terized by the Defendant Western States during depositions as a 
"fishing expedition." (R. 771, Line 2) The Plaintiff's expert 
further characterized Fashion Centre as negligent in not providing 
background information from which the examiner would frame the 
-12-
questions and contributed and induced the examiner to violate 
state polygraph regulations by requesting a polygraph test with 
the question format supplied by Fashion Centre. (R. 276-284) 
Plaintiff continued to look for work in the retail trade but 
was only able to find temporary part-time, seasonal (Christmas) 
work. Shortly after discovering that Brooks had obtained the 
false reference. Plaintiff filed suit alleging causes of action 
as follows: 
1. Negligence in the administration, interpretation 
and reporting of the first polygraph examination as 
against both the polygrapher, Joseph Torman dba Western 
States, and the employer Fashion Centre. 
2. Defamation as against both the employer and the 
polygrapher. 
3. Wrongful termination (both ex contractu and ex 
delicto) as against the employer. 
4. Interference with prospective economic advantage 
as against the employer. 
5. Intentional and negligent infliction of emotional 
distress as against the employer. (See R. 1) 
Shortly after filing the complaint the employee moved the 
court to allow an amendment to the complaint to allege an 
additional cause of action for wrongful termination based upon 
§34-37-16(2). (R. 30) Judge Walquist denied the motion to amend 
the complaint. (R. 101) 
-13-
The District Court (Judge Hyde) dismissed at the summary 
judgment stage the causes of action set forth in paragraphs 1 
and 5. (R. 302) 
During trial/ Judge Roth dismissed the causes of action 
alleged in paragraphs 2 and 4 (R. 955-958) and gave the jury 
instructions set forth at R. 322-348 as to the wrongful ter-
mination cause of action. Following the entry of the order on 
the jury verdict, the Plaintiff moved the court for a new trial 
(R. 447-484) which was denied. (R. 499) This appeal was then 
taken. (R. 501) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
I. An implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing exists 
in all contracts under Utah Law. 
(a) The basic nature of an employer-employee relation-
ship is contractual. Notwithstanding the "at-will" classifi-
cation of the relationship (as opposed to a contract of 
employment of specific duration) the implied covenant of good 
faith and fair dealing is an inherent aspect of the "at-will" 
employment contract. 
(b) The jury instructions materially mistated the 
applicable law by requiring the jury to find an employment 
contract before considering the evidence as to whether the 
employer breached the covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing. 
(c) The Trial Court erred in failing to grant the 
Plaintiff's motion for a new trial. The interests of justice 
require the law concerning "at-will" employment relationship 
be clarified. 
II. The District Court committed error in denying the 
Plaintiff's motion to amend her complaint to include a cause of 
action for wrongful termination based upon Section 34-37-16(2) 
U.C.A. which declares it unlawful to terminate an employee for 
failure to pass or submit to a polygraph examination. 
III. The District Court committed error when it granted partial 
summary judgment and dismissed the negligence cause of action 
against Western States Polygraph and the employer. Western States 
Polygraph and the employer owed the Plaintiff a duty to conduct 
and interpret the polygraph examination in a prudent manner. As 
a direct result of Western's breach of this duty, the employer 
requested additional examinations which ultimately led to the 
Plaintiff's termination. The Trial Court erred when it removed 
this factual issue (causation-causal connection) from the jury 
and granted partial summary judgment ruling that Plaintiff was 
terminated for failure to take the third polygraph examination. 
ARGUMENT 
I 
THE COVENANT OF GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING 
IMPLIED BY LAW IN ALL CONTRACTS IS INHERENT 
IN EMPLOYMENT CONTRACTS, INCLUDING A 
TRADITIONAL "AT-WILL" EMPLOYMENT/EMPLOYEE 
CONTRACT. THE BREACH OF THE COVENANT TO 
GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING CAN RESULT IN 
A CAUSE OF ACTION MATURING FOR BREACH OF 
CONTRACT. 
-IS-
Over the past few yearsf several courts have made numerous 
£/ 
inroads to the Doctrine of Employment At-Will. 
"In the past five years, virtually every state 
court has had to confront whether and how to 
curtail an employer's reliance on the employment 
at-will rule. Employers had relied on the rule 
to discharge employees in their absolute dis-
cretion except as limited by statute or contract. 
Now a majority of jurisdictions to varying 
degrees have abrogated emoloyment at-will by 
recognizing causes of actions for wrongful 
discharge. . ." Springer, ^he Wrongful Discharge 
Case, Trial, June 1985, at p. 38. 
These inroads are a result of the inherent unfairness of the tra-
5/ 
ditional rule. Increasingly, the courts have been willing to 
recognize a cause of action for wrongful discharge even where the 
employment is of an indefinite duration or where the employee is 
1/ 
See Note, Protecting At-Will Employees Against Wrongful 
Discharge; The Dutv to Terminate Only in Good Faith, 93 Harv. 
L. Rev. 1816 (1980); Rohwer, Terminable-At-Will Employment; New 
Theories for Job Security, 15 Pac. L. Jour. 759 (1984); Blades, 
Employment at Will vs. Individual Freedom; On Limiting the Abusive 
Exercise of Employer Power, 67 Col. L. Rev. 1404 (1967); Note, 
Implied Contract Rights To Job Security, 26 Stan. L. Rev. 335 
(1974); See generally, Employment-At-Will Subcommittee, Employment 
and Labor Relations Law Committee; ABA Litigation Section, 1984 
Report (Aug. 4, 1984). See also 1 and 2 Employment-At-Will 
Reporter (May 1983 - January 1985); ALI-ABA Course of Study, 
Advanced Labor and Employment Law - 1984 "The Developing Law of 
Wrongful Termination" pp. 511-610 1984 Handbook, Co-sponsored by 
ABA Labor and Employment Law Section, July 16-20, 1984, Boulder, 
Colorado; Annotation, Discharge of At-Will Employee, 12 ALR 4th 
544 (1982). 
1/ 
Judge Meyer of the New York Court of Appeals refers to this 
as "The bizarre origin of the termination at-will rule. See text 
at Footnote 1 Murphy v. American Home Products Corp., 448 N.Y. 2d 
86 (New York) 1983. See also pp. 760-762 Relating the historical 
development of the employment relationship, Rohwer, Terminable-
at-Will Employment: New Theories for Job Security, infra, foot-
note 4 above. 
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A CAUSE OF ACTION FOR WRONGFUL DISCHARGE (BREACH 
OF CONTRACT) EXISTS UNDER UTAH LAW. UTAH AT-WILL-
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As the case has progressed, this author i :F T:he opinion that 
the cause of action, is ex contract* ' ho ^han ex delicto. See 
B e ck v. Farmers, Ins. Exchange, : , 1 7 Ut. Adv. Rep. 3 
( No."18926, filed June 12, 1.98 5; 7 ~ 
In Bihlmaier v. Carson, Utah, 603 P.2d 790 (1979) the Court 
refused to grant relief to an employee who had alleged that his 
employer had breached the oral employment contract between them. 
The plaintiff claimed that his employer had constructively 
discharged him by writing on his home loan application that his 
"continued employment depends upon applicant, who is hired on a 
trial basis only." 603 P.2d at 790. The Court reiterated the 
general rule in Utah stating: 
The general rule concerning personal employment 
contracts is, in the absence of some further express 
or implied stipulation as to the duration of the 
employment or a good consideration in addition to 
services contracted to be rendered, the contract is 
no more than an indefinite general hiring which is 
terminable at the will of either party. (id. 791 
emphas i s suppli ed.) 
See also Crane Company v. Dahl, 576 P.2d 870 (Utah, 1978) and 
Bullock v. Desert Dodge Truck Center, Inc., 354 P.2d 559 (Utah, 
1960). 
The Bihlmaier Court, however, cited in support for reaching 
its decision, the Idaho case of Jackson v. Minidoka Irrigation 
District, 563 P.2d 54 (Idaho, 1977), where the Idaho Supreme Court 
recognized a cause of action for wrongful termination. It must 
also be noted that the Utah Supreme Court has also held in a 
recent case that a personnel policy manual gives rise to employee 
contractual rights. Piacitelli v. Southern Utah State College, 
Utah, 636 P.2d 1063 (1981). 
It was submitted to the trial court by the Plaintiff that the 
Fashion Centre policy manual constituted "the express or implied" 
pxcen- i *n v1- • : ' r B i h l m a i e r r e c o g n i z e d t o t h e a t - w i l l 
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EyCH"r'' . t'H ituations lit ; 
• ' ^ dismissed unless a verbal and 
iiave been issued and a reasonable or 
performance has been provided. 
See Exhi bi t 3 P. 
In this: * * i* i*i;m' specificallv orowid^d that the 
employee cc -\ i -. n 
test. Howevei . .. submitted ^JM pas^e<* t i first polygraph test 
and submitted and nassed thp second polygranh t^st* ^<*on - ^ 
Defendant Fasl :i 
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test constitutes groim-iF for termination. How many tests would 
varni ng 
o :Tiprove 
she have been required to submit to? Does such conduct constitute 
a breach of the implied covenant of good faith inherent in all 
contractual relations? 
It is submitted by the Plaintiff that the foregoing policy 
constitutes an "express stipulation" to the employment contract 
between the parties as well as creates the basis upon which the 
Defendant breached the "implied" covenant of good faith inherent 
in their employment contract. 
The Bihlmaier case discussed above is the most recent case 
discussing the general rule. This case restates the general law 
as establishing an at-will employment contract as "terminable at 
the will of either party" unless some express or implied con-
ditions to the employment contract exist. This language and line 
of reasoning are not new. See the case of Held v. American Linen 
Supply, 6 Utah 2d 106, 307 P.2d 210 (1957). This case is 
interesting because this case specificallv addresses a situation 
in which there were express contractual provisions added to the 
at-will employment contract. 
The court in American Linen Supply stated: 
Whether respondent has a cause of action if she were 
discharged without just cause depends upon the terms 
of the contract, either express or implied, as stated 
in 35 Am Jur Section 34, page 469, 
"In the absence of something in the contract 
of employment to fix a definite term of service, 
or other contractual provisions to restrict 
the right of the employer to discharge, or 
some statutory restriction upon this right, an 
employer may lawfully discharge an employee 
at what time he pleases and for what cause he 
chooses, without thereby becoming liable to an 
action d-jaimi . i-- n qeneval cor-tiact *•' 
hlrinq is ordinarilv deemed ^ cont* .:* ter-
minable at the .;'1 of either the employer or 
the employee- . • Whether in anv particular 
case an employer can discharqe his employee 
without cause, and not inci ir a. liability is a 
question to be resolved with reference to th^ 
express and implied terms of the contract. . .f! 
i d.7 pages 21 ] 2] 2 (Emphasis supplied) 
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the majoxit stated: 
He re tl :ie term i i la t i oi I m e c h a n i sin de s cr i bed i n tl le 
personnel manual, which the District Court found 
to govern the terms of the contract between the 
college and its employee, was the sole means by 
Which the college could extinguish the contrac-
tual relationship 
This result compo:i : t 3 i 1 :I: I what we dee:i rt t :: • 1: • * 
sound policy for c :: • i Itra : :tua 1 employer• • BI ITI: 1 oy ee 
relations. It will encourage employers to comply 
prompt!y with their contractua1 termination pro 
cedures, and if they fail to do so will impose .. • 
the monetary consequences on the party at fault. 
If the rule were otherwise, the employer would 
discharge the employee summarily and then omit 
or delay the contractual termination procedures 
with inipi inity so long as it was in possession of 
evidence which, when ultimately provided, would 
justify the discharge. In that circumstance, the 
employee, without notice of the reason for his 
dismissal and without any opportunities to refute 
the charges, would remain in an indefinite and 
painful state of limbo, uncertain about his 
ultimate right to reinstatement or back pay. If 
our rule works any hardship on employers, they 
can afford it bv prompt and substantial compliance 
with the procedures to v/hi ch th<~-- hn\*^ agreed. 
Where as ii I tl lis case the policy and oiocedure manual provide 
specific instances and cause for termination and otherwise prohi-
bit termination, the Defendant Fashion Centre was bound to those 
terms and conditions. The express terms of the contract as well 
as implied terms existing in all contracts under Utah law provide 
a basis with which the Plaintiff is allowed to proceed for reco-
very. 
C. IMPLIED COVENANT OF GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING. 
Utah has long recognized that an implied covenant of good 
faith and fair dealing is inherent in every contract entered into 
in this state. Beck v. Farmers Ins. Exchange, Utah, P.2d 
1985 (12 Utah Adv. Rep. 3 No. 18926 filed 6/12/85); Leigh 
Furniture & Carpet Co. v. Isom, Utah, 657 P.2d 293 (1982); Prince 
v. Elm Co. Inc., Utah, 649 P.2d 820 (1982); W.P. Harlin 
Construction Co. v. Utah State Road Commission, 9 Utah 2d 364, 431 
P.2d 792 (1967). 
Restatement, Second, Contracts, Section 205 flatly provides: 
"Every contract imposes upon each party a duty of good faith and 
fair dealing in its performance and its enforcement." This con-
cept is also recognized in Section 1-203 of the Uniform Commercial 
Code as well as by Williston Contracts (3rd edition §670, 1295) 
which tells us in Section 1295 (volume 11, page 39) that: 
"Wherever, therefore, a contract cannot be carried out the way 
in which it was obviously expected that it should be carried out 
without one party or the other performing some act not expressly 
promised by him, a promise to do that act must be implied." 
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D. UTAH LAW SHOULD FOLLOW THE MAJORITY RULE 
THAT HAS BEEN ADOPTED IN OTHER STATES. 
The Utah law discussed above is not new nor is such unusual. 
Recent cases from other jurisdictions have adopted positions simi-
lar to that expressly provided for by Utah law. 
Interpretation of employee handbooks and personnel policies 
or practices as a contract. The following cases have held that 
the employee handbook/ personnel policies or employment practices 
constitute express provision of an employment contract. 
Toussant v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Michigan, 408 Mich. 
579, 292 N.W.2d 880 (1980) employee discharged without good cause 
under employer's policy manual which states that it was the 
company1s policy to require good cause for discharge and that the 
employee had also been told that as long as he did his job well he 
would have a job with Blue Cross; these representations the court 
concluded gave the employee legitimate expectation of job security 
on which he could base a cause of action in contract for 
discharge. See also Winer v. McGraw Hill! Inc. 457 N.Y.S.2d 
193, 443 N.E.2d 441 (1983); Yartzoff v. Democrate Harold Printing 
Co. 281 Ore. 651f 576 P.2d 356 (1978), Southwest Gas Corporation 
v. Ahmad, 668 P.2d 261 (Nev. Supreme Court 1983); and Smith v. 
Carville Bus Company, Inc., 709 F.2d 914 (5th Cir. 1983). 
In addition to these cases, the following cases have found 
that certain practices as well as the written employment contract 
included a duty of good faith and fair dealing. Gates v. Life of 
Montana Insurance Company, Montana, 668 P.2d 213 (1983) (discharge 
w i t h o u t warni ng and opportun11y of hearIng breached covenant of 
tat t deaJ n IH| ai id g< :: c:> I f ai t! i c r e a t i n g a to] : t: slaim; punitiv e dama-
ges available upon proof of malice,,, oppression or fraud) ; Pugh viL 
Cleary v. American Airlines, Inc. , ] 1 1 Cal , App. 3d 443, 168 Cal. 
Rep. 722 (] 980) ; Fortune v. The National Cash Register Co. , 373 
Mas; 3. 9 6, 3 IS \ N ] ! 2d 11 251 (1 977) (specificall y finding :i mplied 
covenant *f good faith and fai r deal i n g ai id that a termination not 
m a d f * • i :> 3 f a 1 11: I c o i I s t i t \ 11 e s a b r * a c 1 l o f t h e • ::i! o i 111: a c t) 
r M ^  :>11 ow i ng s t a t e s r e c og n i z e a nd g i: a in t a n empl oy e e a t o r t 
remedy * • wr ongf u 1 d i s cha r g e : Cal i f orn I a, Connee t i c u t , I d a h o
 f 
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 r ] 1 :i • ::;: h :ii • g a i i , N e w II e r s e y #> 
P e n n s y l v a n i a and W i s c o n s i n . c5ee a l s o R e p o r t of Committee on Labor 
and Employment Law At-Wi 1 ] F ^ i - r ^ - ^ an(=| *---- ^—bl em of Unji i s t 
Di s inissa 1 , 36 Record of A s s o c i a t . , >f ] 3ai: of New 1 ork Ci t> a t ;. 
page 21 1, Note 1 30 
••:. THE TRIAL COURT INCORRECTLY INSTRUCTED 
THE JURY ON THE LAW TO APPLY IN THE CASE. 
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j udgment (R•288) ; and 
Second, Assuming arguendo that Plaintiff's counsel failed 
to preserve the error (by failing to except to the instructions 
given with the requisite specificity) the Suoreme Court in its 
discretion and based upon the interests of justice should review 
the failure to give a proper instruction because state law is suf-
ficiently vague and confusing that the failure to frame a proper 
instruction should not be attributed as error to the Trial Court 
or either party. 
1. The Trial Court did not follow the "law of the case" 
established by Judge Hyde's "ruling on motion for summary 
judgment." 
At the conclusion of the Plaintiff's and Defendants' cases, 
Judge Roth instructed the jury on the law (R. 322-348) and then 
submitted the matter to the jury on four interrogatories (See R. 
350-351). Question 1 required the jury to answer yes or no to the 
following: "Question No. 1: "At the time Plaintiff's employment 
with the Defendant was terminated, was an employment contract in 
existence?" 
The Plaintiff would respectfully submit that the Trial Court 
erred in requiring the jury to determine that at the time the 
Plaintiff was terminated there was an employment contract in 
existence. It appears that the jury and/or the court misun-
derstood the Plaintiff's position relative to the breach of the 
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing aspect of the 
case. The Plaintiff would submit that there was an employment 
contract in existence, albeit oral, and the jury was confused. 
j
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Defendant Fashion Centre Ltd. Memorandum of Law appears at 
R. 1 74-207; Motion for Summary Judgment appears at R, 208-211; 
Affidavit of Bennet Lerner at R.212-213. Defendant Torman dba 
Western States Polygraph Motion for Summary Judgment at R. 216-
219 and Memorandum of Law at R. 220-229. Plaintiff's Memorandum 
responding to Defendant Torman's Motion for Summary Judgment 
appears at R. 238-254, Although the Plaintiff's affidavits 
opposing summary judgment appears at R. 259-26-1; R. 266-269, 
and R. 276-2 84, the Plaintiff's memorandum, of law responding tr-
Fashion Centre has not been paginated by the Clerk of the Dirt-* 
Court but is contained in the manilla envelope marked R, 81. 
Hopefully this was an oversight and Judge Hyde did n •'. make his 
r t 12 i n g s w I t h o \ 11 t h e ben e f i t o f t h i s M e m o r a n d u IT • 
In disposing of the three pending motions, Judge Hyde, 
following argument, issued his "Ruling on Motion for Summary 
Judgment" (R. 288-291). A full copy of the Ruling is reproduced 
as Appendix 3 of this brief. At page 3, Judge Hyde ruled that two 
questions were to be submitted to the jury. The questions of 
"whether or not the policy manual is the 'express or implied' 
exception to the 'at-will' rules, together with the questions of 
good faith and fair dealing." (R. 290) (Emphasis supplied.) 
However, in submitting the case to the jury on the four 
special interrogatories, the two issues which Judge Hyde ruled 
were to go to the jury were not preserved. The issue of whether 
or not the employment personnel policies and procedures created 
an express limitation upon the at-will employment relationship 
was preserved; however, the other issue which judge Hyde iden-
tified, i.e., whether or not the implied covenant of good faith 
and fair dealing was violated at the time of discharge, was not 
preserved. 
Counsel for the Plaintiff attempted during the proceedings 
(see R. 945 L. 21-25) to point out the significance of Judge 
Hyde's ruling and that once made Judge Hyde's ruling became the 
law of this case until reversed or clarified upon appeal. 
Sittner v. Big Tar Sands & Oil, Inc., Utah, 692 P.2d 735 (1984) • 
The trial court, however, instructed Plaintiff's counsel 
that the trial court interpreted Judge Hyde's ruling differently. 
(R. 945 L. 25 to R. 946 L. 3) The trial court had already 
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Pistonef 25 Utah 2d 63f 475 P.2d 839 (1979); McCall v. Kendrick, 
2 Utah 2d 364f 274 P.2d 962 (1954); c.f. Rule 51 U.R.C.P. which 
"gives this Court some latitude to consider objections not pro-
perly preserved below." Morgan v. Quailbrook Condominium Co., 
P.2d , 15 Utah Adv. Rep. 16 (08/06/85 No. 18623). 
The Plaintiff would respectfully submit that unusual and 
compelling circumstances exist in this case inasmuch as the Utah 
law surrounding the at-will employee/employer relationship is 
not clear. Does there exist a cause of action for wrongful 
termination? Is such ex delicto or ex contractu in nature? Is 
the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing a limitation 
on the employer's ability to terminate the employee? Are the 
employment personnel policy and procedure manuals part of the 
employment contract/relationship? 
In addressing these issues, the trial judge requested pro-
posed instructions. One of the Plaintiff's proposed instructions 
(part of R. 81) is attached hereto as Appendix 4. Judge Roth 
elected to give instructions 8, 13 and 15 (R. 330, 335 & 337) 
which on their face seem to state correct law. (See Appendix 5.) 
Hpwever, the jury instructions taken together are incorrect 
because as a matter of law, the employment relationship which 
exists between the employer and the employee is a contract. 
Merely because the employment relationship is "at-will" does not 
destroy the underlying nature of the relationship from being 
contractual. The employee who is an "employee at-will" has a 
fully effective employment contract just as if it were an express 
written contract of specific duration except ^ r ' v-% I - *• >t * -* l 
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II 
JUDGE WALQUIST'S SUMMARY DENIAL OF THE 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO AMEND HER COMPLAJNT 
TO INCLUDE A CAUSE~OF ACTION BASED UPON 
§34-37-16(2) WAS ERROR, 
A. Background 
The P l a i n t i f f ' s comoliin?- -*17.1 • wa.; f i l ^ d >a "- tob^r 
1983 In 3 a t e Febri i a ry t he Plain*-* rL t u e ' 
c o m p l a i n t (R.41) t o a l l e g e an a d a i L ^ n a l ^;v;se oi - in .- • based 
upon a perceived violation of §34-37-16(2) as interpreted by the 
Utah State Legislature, Office of Legislative General Counsel, 
Opinion No. 81-012, which had subsequent to the filing of the 
complaint come to Plaintiff's counsel's attention. 
An objection (R.51) to the Plaintiff's motion to amend the 
complaint was filed by the Defendant Fashion Centre. In accor-
8/ 
dance with Rule 2.8, the Plaintiff filed a reply to the objection 
(R.63) attaching thereto a complete copy of Opinion No. 81-012 
(R.69) as well as the affidavit of the representative Dale 
Stratford (R.74), the sponsor of the floor amendment to §34-37-16 
U.C.A., which added subparagraph (2). 
On April 18, 1984, the Plaintiff's motion came before Judge 
Walquist (R.82). After a short discussion with counsel for both 
Plaintiff/employee and the Defendant/emplover, the Court summarily 
(without reading or reviewing either parties' memoranda) denied 
the Plaintiff's motion. (A complete copy of the hearing is con-
tained in the record on appeal at R. 508 to R.518.) 
B. Discussion 
The employer submitted to the District Court that the addi-
tion of a cause of action based upon Section 34-37-16(2) was 
irrelevant and immaterial because they felt that §16(2) applied 
only to "voice stress" examinations. However, the legislature did 
not intend subsection (2) to be limited solely to "voice stress" 
examinations, but wasnted subsection (2) to apply to all deception 
detection examinations. 
8/ 
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2 to this brief). The Floor Amendment placed a semicolon after 
the word "deception," interjected the word f,£r" and then added 
the separate second provisio in the statute. 
It is submitted by the employee that the effect of the 
Floor Amendment as such was to make the two provisions of the 
statute operate completely in the disjunctive, otherwise, the 
Legislature would not have used the word '"or." The second 
proviso is a completely separate operative provision. 
The Plaintiff would also submit that reference to "such 
examination" is meant to specifically refer to a "deception 
detection" which phrase qualifies the word "examination" used 
twice previously in Section 16. This position is supported by 
Legislative General Counsel's Opinion 81-012. 
The foremost rule of construction of a statute is to achieve 
legislative intent. "The intention of the Legislature, however, 
should be controlling and no formalistic rule of grammer or word 
form should stand in the way of carrying out the legislative 
intent." Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Salt Lake City, Utah, 575 P.2d 
705, 706 (1978). In addition to this, the Utah Supreme Court in 
the case of Brickyard Homeowners Association v. Gibbon Realities, 
Utah, 668 P.2d 535, 538, (1983) recognized the duty axiomic upon 
the court to interpret the statutes of the state liberally with 
the view to effect their objects to promote justice. Section 
66-3-2 U.C.A., 1953 as amended. 
The legislative history regarding this Section (see Appendix 
2) discloses that Representative Stratford amended Section 16 on 
the floor by including the second provisio after the disjunctive 
f,or" to effectuate adding an additional, separate remedy to the 
Section. It would seem incumbent upon the Court to realize that 
the interpretation urged by the employer would accomplish the 
same result had the Floor Amendment been excluded. It makes the 
Floor Amendment completely meaningless, i.e., the Legislature had 
made voice detection examinations unlawful by the first proviso 
and ipso facto since they were unlawful inside and outside the 
state, then what would be the effect of making it unlawful for a 
person who refuses to submit to such examination to be terminated 
or denied employment. You accomplish nothing by making the same 
act unlawful twice. Presumptively, you must assume the 
Legislature was attempting to add an additional limitation. 
The Floor Amendment was intended to broaden the rights of 
employees having to take the deception detection examinations as 
defined in Section 2 of the Act (§34-37-2). (See Affidavit of 
Representative Stratford - Appendix 1.) Furthermore, the facts 
of this case disclose on the face of the Complaint that not-
withstanding Plaintiff's passing said examinations, that the 
Defendant nonetheless terminated her for refusing to submit to 
a third polygraph examination. The intended scope of Section 16, 
as amended by Representative Stratford, was to broaden the rights 
of the citizens of this state in having their employment rela-
tionship adversely affected on the basis of a deception detection 
examination when such examinations are highly questionable. See 
comments 13 Houston L. Rev. 550-70 (1976); 30 Ark. L. Rev. 35-48 
Spring 1976; 96 Banking L. Journal 313-24 (1979). The proposed 
amendment is not unique; at least 15 states including some imme-
diate neighboring states have statutes which forbid employers from 
requiring polygraph tests. See Footnote 1, 24 Cornell L. Rev. 29 
(1977). The neighboring states include Idahof Montana, Oregon, 
Washington, California, Alaska and Hawaii. 
The remedies provided for in Section 16 are intended to be 
broad and to deal with three instances. First, a surreptitious 
examination - an examination given when the subject is not aware 
of it. Second, an examination given by an instrument which can 
only measure voice stress or a "voice only" test. Third, the 
instance which an employee's refusal to submit to a polygraph 
examination is used as the basis for denying or terminating 
employment. 
The employee would submit that as a matter of statutory 
construction, this Court should construe the second provisio of 
the statute as encompassing all deception detection examinations 
to accomplish the obvious intent of the Legislature. Any other 
interpretation leads to an absurd result as pointed out in both 
the legislative counsel's opinion and the affidavit of 
Representative Stratford, the sponsor of the Floor Amendment. 
The employee would respectfully submit that any other interpreta-
tion would be in violation of the principles espoused in 
Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Salt Lake City, supra, and allow a for-
malistic rule of grammer or a word to stand in the way of carrying 
out legislative intent. 
For the reasons outlined above, the Plaintiff would submit 
that Judge Walquist's ruling, denying the Plaintiff's motion to 
amend the complaint to state an additional cause of action based 
upon §34-37(2) was prejudicial error. 
Ill 
JUDGE HYDE ERRONEOUSLY GRANTED SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT ON THE "NEGLIGENCE CAUSE OF 
ACTION" WHICH ALLEGED THAT THE PLAINTIFF 
WAS TERMINATED AS A RESULT OF THE POLY-
GRAPHER AND EMPLOYER'S NEGLIGENCE IN 
ADMINISTERING, INTERPRETING AND REPORTING 
THE RESULTS OF THE FIRST POLYGRAPH TEST. 
£/ 
As mentioned earlier the cross motions for summary judgment 
came before Judge Hyde on December 7, 1984. Judge Hyde dismissed 
the negligence causes of action asserted by the Plaintiff against 
the polygrapher and the employer ruling as a matter of law that 
"the taking of the [first] test, the method of taking 
[administering] the test, or the interpretation of the test 
was not the cause of the discharge of Plaintiff. The cause of 
her discharge was the failure to take the third polygraph test." 
(R. 291) 
The Plaintiff would respectfully submit that by so ruling, 
Judge Hyde determined a question of fact and removed the causation 
issue, normally a factual question from the jury and committed 
error by qranting summary judgment to the Defendants. 
1/ 
See Pages 27-28 of this brief. 
The issue of proximate cause is ordinarily a matter to be 
submitted to the jury for its determination. Mitchell v. Pearson 
Enterprises, Utahf 697 P.2d 240 (1985); Harris v. Utah Transit 
Authority, Utah, 671 P.2d 217 (1983). The Plaintiff should not 
have been deprived of the privilege of having an adjudication on 
her claim unless it appears that even on the facts claimed by her 
she could not establish her claim. Watters v. Querry, Utah, 626 
P.2d 455 (1981); Rees v. Albertsons, Inc., Utah, 587 P.2d 130 
(1978); Jensen v. Dolen, 12 Utah 2d 404, 367 P.2d 191 (1962). 
The Restatement, Second, Torts §328B. and §328C. succinctly 
set forth the rules concerning the role and function of the judge 
and the jury relative to issues of facts. Section 328B. provides: 
§328B. Functions of Court 
In an action for negligence the court determines: 
(a) whether the evidence as to the facts makes 
an issue upon which the jury may reasonabley find 
the existence or non-existence of such facts; 
(b) whether such facts give rise to any legal 
duty on the part of the defendant; 
(c) the standard of conduct required of the 
defendant by his legal duty; 
(d) whether the defendant has conformed to 
that standard, in any case in which the jury may 
not reasonably come to a different conclusion; 
(e) the applicability of any rules of law 
determining whether the defendant's conduct is 
a legal cause of harm to the plaintiff; and 
(f) whether the harm claimed to be suffered 
by the plaintiff is legally compensable. 
(Emphasis supplied) 
Section 328C. provides: 
§328C. Functions of Jury 
In an action for negligence the jury determines, 
in any case in which different conclusions may 
be reached on the issues: 
(a) the facts, 
(b) whether the defendant has conformed to 
the standard of conduct required by the law. 
(c) whether the defendant's conduct is a 
legal cause of the harm to the plaintiffy and 
(d) the amount of compensation for legally 
compensable harm. (Emphasis added.) 
In defining proximate cause, this court in Mitchell v. 
Pearson Enterprises, supraf stated: 
The standard definition of proximate cause 
is "that cause which, in natural and continuous 
sequence, (unbroken by an efficient intervening 
cause), produces the injury and without which 
the result would not have occurred. It is the 
efficient cause-the one that necessarilv sets 
in operation the factors that accomplish the 
injury." 
In opposing the Defendant's motion for summarv judgment, the 
Plaintiff introduced the affidavit of an expert witness whose cre-
dentials disclosed that he was a professor of psychology at the 
University of Utah and possessed 15 years of training and research 
as well as substantial experience and training in the use of the 
polygraph. (R. 276) Substantial evidence was adduced in this 
affidavit which raised a material question of fact whether the 
Defendants' negligence set in motion a force which ultimately 
caused the Plaintiff's injury - termination from employment. 
WA single sworn statement is sufficient to create an issue of 
fact. Clearly, it is not for a court to weigh the evidence or 
assess credibility." Webster v. Sill, Utah, 675 P.2d 1170 (1983). 
But for the Defendant Fashion Centre's negligence in 
designing the questions and the negligence of Western in admi-
nistering and interpreting the results, it is undisputed that 
the second and third polygraph tests would not have been required. 
The Defendant Western maintained that the discharge of the 
employee by the employer was because of her refusal to submit to 
the third polygraph test and that it had nothing to do with the 
first examination. This position was completely contrary to the 
affidavit of Bennet Lerner, Vice President - Personnel (R. 212) 
which indicated that the reason the second and third tests were 
requested was because the first polygraph showed "deception" 
(paragraph 3) and the company wanted to give the employee an 
opportunity to "clear herself" (paragraph 4) and requested the 
third polygraph to "reconcile" with the other two (paragraph 6) 
(see also R.905, lines 24-25f and R. 907, lines 8-24). 
There was no counter-affidavit filed by Western contradicting 
Mr. Lernerfs affidavit. The District Court should not have 
granted summary judgment dismissing the negligence cause of action 
as there was a material question of fact whether the negligence 
committed in the course of the first exam was causally connected 
with the Plaintiff1s termination. 
In Apache Tank Lines, Inc. v. Cheney, Utah, P.2d
 f 18 
Utah Adv. Rep. 19 (No. 19573 filed September 20, 1985) this court 
held: 
In an appeal from a summary judgment, 
we view the evidence and all reasonable 
inferences to be drawn therefrom in the 
light most favorable to the losing party. 
Hall v. Warren, Utah 632 P.2d 848 (1981); 
accord Blackhurst v. Transamerica 
Insurance Co., Utah 699 P.2d 688 (1985). 
Summary judgment should be granted with 
great caution in negligence cases. 
Williams v. Melby, Utah 699 P.2d 723 
(1985). Issues of negligence ordinarily 
present questions of fact to be resolved 
by the fact finder. It is only when the 
facts are undisputed and but one reason-
able conclusion can be drawn therefrom 
that such issues become questions of law. 
FMA Acceptance Co. v, Leatherbv Insurance 
Co., Utah, 594 P.2d 1332 (1979). Like-
wise, oroximate cause is usually a 
factual issue and in most circumstances 
will not be resolved as a matter of law. 
Unigard Insurance Co. v. City of LaVerkin, 
Utah, 689 P.2d 1344 (1984). This case 
poses no exception. 
Whether the negligence of the Defendants was the proximate 
cause of the Plaintiff's termination was a question for the jury. 
From the evidence before the court, a jury could have reasonably 
found that the negligence associated with the first polygraph was 
the proximate cause of the termination and accordinqly hold the 
Defendants liable. The court invaded the province of the jury 
when it granted summary judgment to Western and Fashion Centre on 
the grounds that the proximate cause was the employee's failure 
to take the third polyqraph test when it was scheduled. 
CONCLUSION 
The Plaintiff would respectfully submit that the questions 
raised by this appeal relative to the rights and obligations of 
employees and employers in traditional at-will employment con-
tracts are important issues which can be resolved under existing 
principles of law concerning contracts. The implied covenant of 
good faith and fair dealing which has universally been recognized 
as existing in all contractual relationships is a limitation on 
the employer's right to terminate the employee. The termination 
must be done in good faith, even if the employer's power to 
terminate the employment relationship is one under which the 
employer has this right to terminate at-will (See Comment (e) §205 
Restatement, Second, Contracts). There is no compelling reason 
to read out of an at-will employment relationship the implied 
covenant of qood faith and fair dealing, regardless of the fact 
that the employment relationship is one traditionally or legally 
classified as at-will. 
The issues are of significant importance that the law in Utah 
should be clarified. Because of the uncertainty regarding this 
area of the law, the case should be remanded to the trial court 
with such instructions as will enable the claims to be adjudicated 
to a final conclusion including the claims of negligence and the 
cause of action based upon §34-37-16(2) U.C.A. 
Respectfully submitted this 4th day of October, 1985. 
HARBflvi, PRESTON, GUTK@/& CHAMBERS 
•as&r" 
George/w. Preston, Esq. 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant 
^f. 
eph M. Chambers, Esq. 
torney for Plaintiff/Appellant 
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dba FASHION GAL 
AND FOR WEBER 
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OGDEN, 
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COUNTY, STATE pF-UTAH V:Efi£ 
* 
* 
AFFIDAVIT OF REPRESENTATIVE 
* DALE E. STRATFORD 
* Civil No. 871L3 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
(ss. 
County of Weber ) 
Dale E. Stratford, being first duly sworn, deposes and 
states as follows: 
1. That I am an attorney duly admitted and licensed to 
practice law in the State of tftah, a State Senator and former 
member of the House of Representatives of the State of Utah. 
2. That I first became a state legislator in January, 1977, 
and I was a member of the House of Representatives in 1981, the 
year Section 34-37-16 was passed into law prohibiting the refusal 
to submit to polygraph examinations from being used as the basis 
for terminating or denying employment. 
3. That the information contained herein is based upon my 
own personal knowledge. 
4. That I was the sponsor of the 1981 Floor Amendment to 
Section 34-37-16 which amendment I proposed intending to amend 
APPENDIX "1 
said Section to include an additional provision making it unlaw-
ful in this state to deny or terminate employment upon the basis 
of an individual refusing to submit to a deception detection 
examination, otherwise known as a polygraph examination. 
5. That it was my intent in sponsoring the Floor Amendment, 
and as I explained upon the floor of the House of Representatives, 
that this amendment was to prohibit employers from discharging 
employees who refused to submit to deception detection examina-
tions which as defined in Section 2 of the Act includes polygraph 
examinations, and not merely to prohibit voice stress examinations 
or telephonic tests which were already encompassed in Section 16 
prior to the Floor Amendment. 
6. That my purpose in sponsoring this amendment was to 
clarify public policy in the state of Utah relative to employers 
utilizing polygraph examinations as the basis for either ter-
minating or denying employment when such examinations are not 
wholly accurate and can be abused and misused by employers. The 
Floor Amendment brings Utah in line with our neighboring sister 
states who have enacted similar protective provisions. See Idaho 
Code §§44-903 to 904 (1977); Mont. Rev. Code Ann. §41-119 (Cum. 
Supp. 1975); Ore. Rev. Stat. §659-225, 990(7) (1975); Wash. Rev. 
Code Ann. 44-4944 120-130 (Supp. 1976); Cal. Lab Code §432.2 (West 
1971). 
7. That by referring to "such examination" I intended to 
refer to "deception detection examination" as defined in Section 
2 of the Act and as such the phrase "deception detection" 
qualifies the word examination used twice previously in Section 
16. I did not intend to refer to voice only or voice stress exa-
minations or out of state examinations conducted by telephonic 
means. That although I can now see the language utilized was 
somewhat ackward, I did not intend nor do I believe the Legislature 
intended that "such" refer to voice only or out of state telepho-
nic examinations which leads to an absurd result of making it 
unlawful to base the termination or denial of employment upon the 
refusal of an employee or prospective emplovee to submit to an 
unlawful examination. This was not what was intended and that is 
why I proposed the Floor Amendment adding the semicolon after the 
word "deception," and added the disjunctive "or" and then the 
operative language of the second provisio. 
8. Further Affiant saith not. 
DATED this {# ~ day of April, 19.84. 
Commission Expires: ///pp 
Residing at: / / *, 
R^ iTesfent^ tive Da^ fe E. Stratford 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this L? 
1984. 
-3-
UTAH STATE LEGISLATURE 
OFFICE OF LEGISLATIVE GENERAL COUNSEL 
Opinion No. 81-012 
Date: July 7, 1981 
Requested by: The Honorable Dale E. Stratford 
Utah State Representative 
Opinion by: James L. Wilson 
Associate Legislative General Counsel 
Question: Does Subsection 34-37-16 (2), Utah Code 
Annotated 1953, categorically prohibit 
deception detector tests as the basis for 
denying or terminating employment? 
Conclusion: Yes, but in a rather awkward manner, 
FACTS 
The "Deception Detection Examiners Act" was amended 
during the 1981 General Session of the 44th Legislature by 
Senate Bill No. 173. In its original form, Section 34-37-16 
of the Bill was drafted as follows: 
"It shall be a violation of this act to 
conduct a deception detection examination without 
the physical presence of the subject and through 
a surreptitious manner where a subject is not 
aware of the examination. Furthermore, it shall 
be unlawful for any deception detection examination 
to be conducted by out-of-state examiners through 
telephonic means to anyone in Utah or for Utah 
examiners to use telephonic means to determine 
truth or deception." 
The section was subsequently modified by a floor amendment 
in the House of Representatives to read, in pertinent part: 
"Furthermore, it shall be unlawful for; (1) 
any deception detection examination to be con-
ducted by instrument by out-of-state examiners 
through telephonic means to anyone in Utah or 
for Utah examiners to use telephonic means to 
determine truth or deception; or (2) refusal to 
submit to such examination to be the basis for 
denying or terminating employment." 
The amendment was adopted by the House after brief comments 
by the sponsor of the floor amendment. The amended version 
was ratified by the Senate v/ithout comment and signed into 
law by the Governor. 
Subsequent to the passage of Senate Bill No. 173, the 
Utah State Liquor Control Commijsion attempted to require 
its employees to sign a statement that they would take a 
polygraph examination in connection with their employment 
with the Commission. The statement included a provision 
that refusal to submit to an examination could result in 
dismissal or termination. The Utah Public Employees Association 
has formally challenged this policy and the matter is 
presently in litigation. 
The question presented for analysis focuses on the 
extent of coverage of Subsection 34-37-16 (2), i.e., whether 
it applies to all deception detection examinations that 
relate to an individual's employment, such as the Liquor 
Control Commission matter, or only to limited instances that 
are qualified by the language of Section 16. 
ANALYSIS 
The sole question presented for analysis is one of 
statutory construction as to the. meaning of "such examination" 
in Subsection 34-37-16 (2) . "Examination" is defined in 
Section 34-37-2 of the Bill: 
"As used in this act: 
(2) 'Examination1 means the use of an 
instrument on an individual for the purpose of 
deception detection." 
It would be relatively easy to interpret the meaning of 
"examination" as used in Subsection 34-37-16 (2) if the 
floor amendment had not included the word "such," which is 
a referential or qualifying word. 
The general rule regarding referential or qualifying 
words is well and clearly stated in 2A Sutherland, Statutory 
Construction (4th Ed., Sander, 1973) 159: 
"Referential and qualifying words and phrases 
where no contrary intention appears, refer solely 
to the last antecedant, which consists of the 
last word, phrase or clause that can be made an 
antecedant without impairinj the meaning of the 
sentence. Thus a proviso usually is construed to 
apply to the provision or clause immediately 
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preceding it. The rule is but another aid to 
discovery of intent or meaning, however, and not 
an inflexible and uniformly binding rule. Where 
the sense of the entire act requires that a 
qualifying word or phrase apply to several 
preceding (emphasis added) or even succeeding 
sections, the word or phrase will not be restricted 
to its immediate antecedent." 
A strict or literal reading of Section 34-37-16 would have 
"such" referring back to Subsection (1), so that "such 
examination" would be qualified or limited by the descrip-
tive language of that Subsection. However, if the rule is 
so applied, then it becomes unlawful to base the termination 
or denial of employment on one's refusal to take an unlawful 
examination. The result of applying this interpretation is 
both absurd and unreasonable. 
As noted in Sutherland, supra, the doctrine of the last 
antecedent is not inflexible and is never applied when a 
further extension is clearly required by the intent and 
•meaning of the context or when to apply the rule literally 
would lead to an absurd or unreasonable result defeating the 
legislative purpose. See also Johnson v. Craddock, 228 Or. 
308, 365 P.2d 89 (1961); Salt Lake City v. Salt Lake 
County, 568 P.2d 738 (1977). Strict application of the 
doctrine is inappropriate in Subsection 34-37-16 (2). 
"Such" is defined by Webster as "having the particular 
quality or character specified; certain; representing the 
object as already particularized in terms which are not 
mentioned." State v. Estep, 66 Kan. 416, 71 P. 857 (1903). 
Its meaning, however, is not to be determined solely by the 
dictionary definition, but also by the entire paragraph, the 
mischief it was designed to remedy, and its underlying 
policy. Bahre v. Hogbloom, 162 Conn. 549, 295 A.2d 547 
(197 2). "Such" refers to something which has been mentioned 
before. Richardson-Merrell, Inc. v. Main, 240 Or. 533, 402 
P.2d 746 (1965) . 
The reasonable interpretation of "such examination" is 
manifest by referring back to the definitional section of 
the Bill and applying the broad definition cited therein and 
used throughout the Bill to Subsection 34-37-16 (2). The 
meaning of the context then becomes reasonable and harmonious 
with the rest of the Bill in that it would be unlawful to 
make a refusal to take any or a^  (emphasis added) deception 
detection examination, as defined in Section 34-37-2, the 
basis for denying or terminating employment. Courts have 
held that "such" may be interpreted in statutory context to 
mean "any," Struthers v. People, 116 111. App. 481 (1904), 
or "an Evans v. Commonwealth, 44 Mass. (3 Mete.) 453. 
Additionally, Sutherland, supra, at pp. 221, 222 states: 
"In the course of deliberation on a bill, 
legislators look to its sponsor as well as to 
the representative of the committee having 
charge of it, as one who is expected to be 
particularly well informed about its purpose, 
meaning, and intended effect. In recognition 
of this reality of legislative practice, courts 
give consideration to statements made by a bill's 
sponsor on grounds similar to those relied on to 
support the use of statements by the committeeman 
in charge of the bill." 
Schwegmann Bros, v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384, 
95 L.Ed. 1035, 71 S.Ct. 745 (1951); Stevens v. United States, 
440 F.2d 144 (CA 6th, 1971). The representative who sponsored 
or proposed the floor amendment, while not the original 
sponsor of the Bill, was the only individual who spoke to 
the amendatory language. His comments were brief as follows: 
"Fellow Representatives, we have and have had 
for some time a serious problem with these indivi-
duals that run and operate these particular types 
of businesses. Many businesses nowadays have 
gotten into the business of requiring all employees 
to submit to these examinations. If an individual 
refuses to submit to an examination, they are 
immediately fired or released from their position. 
I think this is the type of thing we need to 
address and we as a body can address it and I think 
it needs to be addressed responsibly." 
There was no further discussion or committee action on this 
amendment in either the House or the Senate. The Represen-
tative's comments clearly appear directed to deception 
detection examination as generally related to employment 
matters, not to the use of telephonic examination. The 
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placement of the amendment is awkward and the use of "such" 
makes the interpretation difficult but not impossible in 
light of the above analysis. 
Finally, it is a well-established rule of statutory 
construction that where the language of a statute is susceptible 
of two constructions, one of which in its application will 
render it .reasonable, fair and harmonious with its manifest 
purpose, and another which would be productive of absurd 
consequences, the former construction will be adopted. 
Reuter v. Board of Supervisors, 220 Cal. 314, 30 P.2d 417 
(1934). Of the two constructions, certainly the application 
of the broad definition of examination as used throughout 
the Bill appears to be reasonable, fair and harmonious. The 
literal construction of "such," if used in a strictly referential 
sense, is not mandated and if applied would be absurd as 
indicated above. There can only be but one reasonable 
construction and that has been determined by examining the 
application of referential and qualifying rules, analyzing 
the definitions and use of "such," looking to the intent of 
the sponsor of the amendatory language and applying the 
construction that is fair and harmonious. "Such examination" 
must be interpreted to refer to any deception detection 
examination as defined in Subsection 34-37-2 (2) of the 
Bill. In retrospect, the entire construction problem could 
have been avoided by making Subsection 34-37-16 (2) a separate 
section, i.e., 34-37-17, or changing the word "such" to 
"any" or "an." 
Respectfully submitted, 
tcu-
James L. Wilson 
Associate Legislative General Counsel 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
SHIRLEY BERUBE, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
FASHION CENTRE, LTD., et al., 
Defendant. 
W 
RULING ON MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Case No. 87113 
Basic relevant facts aref as I understand themf that the 
Plaintiff Shirley Berube was employed by the Defendant Fashion 
Gal as an assistant store manager at the Ogden store. There was 
no written employment agreement between the parties, but Fashion 
Gal did have written rules and regulations regarding personnel 
practices. Specifically, Fashion Gal had rules relating to the 
taking of polygraph tests, which provided that "an employee may 
be terminated without prior warning for the following reasons: 
(g) refusal to take a polygraph test." Defendant Fashion Gal 
concluded that they had an inventory shortage and requested their 
employees to take a polygraph test. The plaintiff took the test 
along with other employees. The test was conducted by Defendant 
Western States using questions supplied by the defendant Fashion 
Gal. The examiner reported to Fashion Gal that the plaintiff 
satisfactorily completed the test, with the exception that they 
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found possible deception in response to the question "Do you know 
for certain who has cheated or stolen anything from Fashion Gal 
store?" As a result of this possible deception, the defendant 
requested a second polygraph test which plaintiff passed. The 
second test was conducted by a different examiner. Whereupon 
defendant requested plaintiff take a third polygraph examination, 
which she refused. Whereupon she was terminated for refusing to 
take a third test. Thereafter, plaintiff, in seeking other 
employment, applied at Brooks in Ogden. When the manager of 
Brooks called the Defendant Fashion Gal store for a reference, 
Jolyn Flint, manager of the store, reported that the plaintiff 
had refused to take a polygraph test and that was the basis for 
her termination. She did not get the job at Brooks. Plaintiff 
thereupon filed this complaint setting forth four causes of 
action, and defendants herein have filed their motions for 
summary judgment. 
First cause of action is entitled "Negligent Misrepre-
sentation". The essence of Count I is that Western owed plain-
tiff a duty to conduct a fair test and exercise reasonable care 
and competence in obtaining its conclusions, and that the 
Defendant Fashion Gal failed to exercise reasonable care in 
determining the standards employed b*T Western. This does not set 
out a cause of action for negligent misrepresentation, or even 
for negligence, inasmuch as the reasons for termination has 
nothing to do with the interpretation of the test, but the 
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failure to take an additional test. Plaintiff was not discharged 
for failing the test and the method of conducting or interpreta-
tion does not relate to the reason for which she was fired. 
Defendant Fashion Gal is granted summary judgment as to Count I. 
Count II entitled "Defamationf Injurious Falsehood, and 
Interference with Prospective Economic Advantage", basically 
hinges on the difference between a polygraph test and the third 
polygraph test. Frankly, it appears to be a play on words to a 
certain extent. However, I feel that the pleading in this cause 
of action does establish an issue of material fact which must be 
viewed in a light most favorable to the plaintiff; motion for 
summary judgment is denied for Count II. 
As to the third count, "Outrageous Conduct Causing 
Severe Emotional Distress", the record herein does not support 
the assertion of plaintiff that the conduct of the defendant was 
so outrageous and extreme that it offended the generally accept-
able standards of decency and morality. There is no genuine 
issue as to any material fact in regard to this count and defen-
dant is granted summary judgment on Count III. 
As to the counts for "Wrongful Termination and Breach of 
Implied Condition of Employment Contract" and "Wrongful 
Discharge" (tort), the question herein basically appears to be 
whether or not the policy manual is the "express or implied" 
exception to the "at will" rules, together with the question of 
good faith and fair dealing. Viewing the matter in a light most 
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favorable to the plaintiff, it appears there may be a genuine 
issue of material fact sufficient to warrant trial. Defendants' 
motion for summary judgment on these counts is denied. 
In regard to Western Polygraph1s motion for summary 
judgment, it appears that they conducted an examination at the 
request of Defendant Fashion Centre, with the consent of the 
plaintiff. The taking of the test, the method of taking the 
test, or the interpretation of the test was not the cause of the 
discharge of plaintiff. The cause of her discharge was the 
failure to take the third polygraph test. The basis of the 
action is wrongful discharge and defamation, none of which apply 
to the Defendant Western. 
xhere does not appear to be a genuine issue as to any 
material fact, and the Defendant Torman dba Western States 
Polygraph1s motion for summary judgment is granted. 
Attorney for Fashion Centre is to prepare an order in 
accordance herewith. 
DATED this / 7) day of December, 1984. 
c 
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// V 
The Plainti£f_Shirley Berube.,.has -alleged a claim against the 
Defendant Fashion..Certtr'e' Ltd. claiming that she was wrongfully 
terminated". 
—-—... you are instructed that there is an implied covenant of good 
faith and fair dealing in every contract that neither party will 
do anything which will injure the rights of the other to receive 
the benefits of the agreement. 
r-JL TA CJat <tf a^ 
You^ a^ e—i-nstrueted^ tha.t., lji^ the employment contract «*~*iw,s 
£^ fte-r—there is an implied obligation of good faith and fair , rS / 
\<£ / dealing on part of both parties, that an employee will not be 
' $ / • 
?-)£ discharged without good cause. 
w
 The term "good cause" as used in these instructions, means 
"a fair and honest cause or reason regulated by good faith on the 
part of the employer." 
*•" " ""'An employer that discharges an employee without good cause 
is liable for a wrongful discharge and all damages proximately 
resulting from such discharge. In considering whether an employer 
acted in good faith or bad faith in discharging an employee from 
employment, you should consider all the evidence which tends to 
establish either good or bad faith, including but not limited to 
evidence of the following factors: 
1. whether or not the employee was discharged for ligi-
timate business and employment reasons; 
2. whether or not an employee was discharged on a pre-
text, that is, for a false reason or motive put forth to hide the 
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3. whether or not the employee was discharged in accor-
dance with the personnel\policy and procedures of the employer; 
\ 
4. any other facts in evidence which tend to establish 
either good or bad faith. / 
Before you can find the Defendant Fashion Centre Ltd. liable 
\ 
for wrongful termination, you must\find the following has been 
proved by a preponderance of the evidence: 
A. The employer Fashion Ceht\e Ltd. acted in bad 
faith in discharging/the Plaintiff Shirley Berube 
/ / 
as assistant manager. 
z 
If the preponderance of ,the evidence doesv support the claim 
\ 
of Shirley Berube, then your verdict should be for Shirley Berube 
and against Fashion Centre/Ltd. 
/ 
The term "preponderance of the evidence" means the greater 
weight of the evidence, thai is, such evidence as, when weighed 
with that opposed to it, is more convincing as to its truth. 
Piacitelli v. Southern Utah State College, Utah, 636 P.2d 1063 
(1981) 
Leigh Funiture & Carpet Co. v. Isom, Utah, 657 P.2s 293, 311 (1982) 
INSTRUCTION NO. £ 
Plaintiff alleges that she had either an express or 
implied employment contract with defendant. Plaintiff further 
alleges that she abided by the terms of said agreement but that 
defendant violated the conditions of the agreement and wrongfully 
terminated plaintiff's employment. Plaintiff further alleges 
that, as a result of such wrongful termination she suffered 
monetary damage and, therefore asks for a judgment against 
defendant for such damage. 
Defendant alleges that no specific employment contract 
existed and thus plaintiff could be discharged at any time with 
or without cause. 
Defendant further alleges that in the event it is 
determined that an employment contract existed, that plaintiff 
violated the rules of the agreement andf therefore, defendant, was 
justified in terminating her employment. Defendant also alleges 
that plaintiff has failed to adequately prove that she suffered 
damage as a result of the termination of her employment. 
The above is not meant to be a statement of facts 
proven, but is a paraphrasing of the allegations of the parties. 
APPENDIX M5 
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The burden of proof is upon plaintiff to prove, by a 
preponderance of the evidence, that an employment contract between 
himself and Defendant did in fact exist. 
If plaintiff fails to satisfy this burden of proof, 
plaintiff cannot recover upon her breach of contract claim and 
you must find for defendant on the breach of contract claim. 
nor* 
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If you find that plaintiff has proven, by a 
preponderance of the evidence, that a contract of employment 
existed between her and defendant and that the terms of this 
contract were as alleged by plaintiff, then you must decide 
whether plaintiff has proven, by a preponderance of the 
evidence, that defendant discharged plaintiff in violation of 
the terms of their contract. 
If you find either that plaintiff voluntarily resigned 
her position or that she was discharged for reasons not in 
violation of the terms of the contract, you must return a 
verdict for defendant on plaintiff's breach of contract claim. 
If you find that plaintiff was discharged in violation 
of the terms of the contract, you must return a verdict for 
plaintiff on her breach of contract claim. 
You are instructed that there is an implied covenant of 
good faith and fair dealing in every contract that neither party 
will do anything which will injure the rights of the other to 
receive the benefits of the agreement. 
In the case of an employment contract, there is an 
implied obligation of good faith and fair dealing on part of 
both parties, that an employee will not be discharged without 
good cause. 
The term "good cause" as used in these instructions, 
means "a fair and honest cause or reason regulated by good faith 
on the part of the employer". 
